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I. INTRODUCI10N 
1. Aim ofthe Latest Amendments: Eliminating Misunderstandings and 
Reorientation of the Listed Joint Stock Company 
51 
Due to globalization and the process of desintermediation, the German 
capital market is currently undergoing far-reaching, structural cbanges. 
Formerly, the German economy was characterized by the dominance of credit 
finance and the relationship between banks and business. Big business was 
linked together througb holding structures and cross-participations, in which 
banks played a majorroJe as Shareholders in industrial conglomerates. Quite 
rightfully, tbe German economy was nicknamed "Deutschland AG" (or 
"Germany Inc."). The stock market was limited to tbe top 100 German 
companies, whereas companies betonging to tbe famous German 
"Mittelstand" were usually private limited companies (GmbH) which used 
bank credit as their mode of finance. Towards the end of tbe twentieth 
century, more and more companies-mostly from the "new economy," but 
also increasingly from the "Mittelstand"-decided to "go public." Tbis trend 
was strengtbened by the establishment of new segments of the "Deutsche 
Börse" (Frankfurt Stock Exchange), e.g. the "Neuer Markt" (New Market, 
more or less the equivalent to the American NASDAQ) and "SMAX" 
(focused on mid-sized companies). 
German Company and Accounting Law was not-and still is 
not-sufficiently prepared fortbis new rise of the capital market. Tbe AktG1 
was designed for big businesses that belonged to the "Deutschland AG." The 
HGB, which practices accounting rules, concentrated on smaller companies. 
Rules for transparency and, hence, investor protection played hardly any role 
and were consequently underdeveloped. Under pressure from European 
I. Note thefollowing abb~viations: ( l)StatuJes: HGB (Handelsgesetzbucb-CommercialCode); 
AktG (Aktiengesetz-:loint Stock Company Act); BörsG (Börsengesetz.-Stoclc Exchange Law); BGB 
(Btirgcrliches Gesetzbucb-Oennan Civil Code); WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsg~an Securities 
Trading Ac t); KWG (Kreditwesengesetz-Baoking Supervis ion Act); KAGG 
( Kapitalanlegesellschaftsgesetz-Act on Investment Companies); AusllnvestmG 
(Auslandsinvestmentgesetz-Act oo Foreign Investment Companies); (2) Courts: BGH (Bundesgerichtshof 
- Federal Supreme Court), OLG (Oberlandesgericht-Regional SupremeCourt), LG (Landgericht-Local 
Court); (3) Other legal sources: BGBI. (Bundesgesetzblatt-Federal Law Gazette); BT·Drs. 
(c Bundestags-Drucksachen- Docume.nts oftheGerman federal legislature); (4) Other source: PAZ 
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ll. ACCOUNTING 
1. Previous Legal Position 
In accounting, it is commonly understood that the scrutiny obligation or 
its equivaJent true andfair view principle pursuant to Art. 264 paragraph 2 s. 
1 HGB,22 obliges a company torender annuaJ Statements in such a way that 
the actuaJ assets, fmance and revenue positions of the company are accurately 
reflected. This principle introduced by the "First Directive on the Annual 
Accounts of 1978,'m however, is counteracted by the fact that the Directive 
itself permits seventy-six different evaJuation principles.24 Optional balance 
sheet procedures laid down in numerous individual regulations are now 
allowed formally, and are, in essence, materially legal according to the 
principles of proper accounting (GoB).25 Nevertheless, they do not necessarily 
reflect the actual position of the limited liability company. In this context, 
companies may or may not reveal the existence of hidden reserves, thereby 
deceiving investors with regard to the actual development and state of the 
company.26 This cannot be called modern European accounting law.27 
22. Art. 264 §§ 1 & 2 BOB. Su Baumbach & Hopt, Art. 264 § 9 HOB, (29th ed. 1995) (using the 
tenninology of "inspcction prohibition"); Koller, Roth et al., att . 264 § 6 HOB (1996). On the bistory of 
English 149 Companies Act 1948 zurückgehenden Prinzips, see Alsheimer, RIW 645-646 (1992). 
23. See Council Dircctive 781660/EEC, 1978 OJ. (L 22) 11 (giving a directory on the annual 
accou.nts of certain types of companies) [hereinafter 4th Dir. on Company Law]; CounciJ Directive 
831349/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1 (7th Dir. on Company Law (giving a directory on consolidated ac<lounts)) 
(both implemented by "Bilanzrichtliniengesetz." v.I9.12.1985 (BGBJ L S.2355) (found in arts. 242,264 
et seq. HOB)). See also Assmann & Buck, EWS 110, 120 et seq. (1990). For an update of European 
legislation see h«p://www.europa.eu.int. 
24. Jonas, DB 1361, 1365 (1978); Grund, DB 1293 (1996). See tllso 4th Dir. on Company Law, 
supra note 23, at art. 31. 
25. Baumbach & Hopl, supra note 22, at art. 243, § 5. 
26. Hopt, 141 ZHR 389,403 (1977) (criticizing the generally accepted opinon); Baumbach & Hopt, 
supra note 22, at art. 253 § 28; KRUSE, GRUNDSÄTZE ORDNUNGSGEMÄßER BUCHF0HRUNO 204 et seq. (3d 
ed. 1979); Scbu!z.e..Osterlob, 1SOZHR 403.417 etseq. (1986); Hüffe:r, AlctG art. 131 § 29 (3d ed. 1997); 
MOXTER, Bll..ANZL.EHRE 75 et seq. ( 1986); BAlL WIESI!R & KUHNER, RECHNUNOSLEGUNOSVORSCHRIFTEN 
UNO WIRTSCHAPTUCHI! STABn.ITÄT 110 et seq. (1994); BUDO!!, EssAYS IN MEMORY OF MOXTER 34, 48 
(1994); BUSSE VON COI.BI!, US-AMERDWHSCHE REcHNuNGSLEGUNG 221, 237 (Ballwieser ed., 1995); 
Kubler, 159 ZHR 550, 560 (1995); Claßen & EnzweiJer et al ., CAPrrAL 36 et seq. (1996) (noting the 
investigation of Küting). 
27. EG-RiL, 4 and 7 (recording the action of the International Accounting Standards Commi«ce). 
See also Claussen, AG 278, 279 (1993); HA VERMANN, EssAYS IN MEMORY OF MOXTER 656, 668 tl stq. 
( 1994); BUSSE VON COl.BI!, MANAOEMENTXONTROI.J..E DURCH REcHNuN<lSLEGUNGSPFUCHTEN 17, 28 tt 
seq. (1994) (Honorary Doctoratelcclure, Univ. of Augsbwg)(d.iscussing thelimitationof accounting law). 
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4 HGB, which speaks of"foreseeable risks and losses,'; but also by everyday 
usage in which cbance is the precise antonym, the counter-part to risk, 
synonymaus with a positive opportunity or futurenegative occurrence.37 De 
lege lata, the construction of the risk concept in the sense of "chance" wiU be 
of limited value. 
b) Disdosure Obligations Pursuant to Art. 285 HGB 
Transparency needs are also served by the obligation to annex statements 
to the balance sheet. According to Art. 285 No. 10 s. 1 HGB, companies are 
obliged to disclose the membership ofboard ofmanagement and supervisory 
board members who are also on the supervisory boards of other corporations. 
According to Art. 285 No. 11 HGB, a company must disclose board member 
participation in other companies if an individual' s share of votes exceeds 5%. 
c) Funds Statement and Segment Report Pursuant to Art. 297 Paragraph 
I HGB 
There is a new Obligation for a listed parent company to provide a funds 
statement and segment report in the group annex. 
d) International Balance Sheets 
The law easing capital raising has created Art. 292a HGB, which relieves 
the listed parent company of the obligation to compile and publish 
consolidated group accounts corresponding to Art. 290 HGB; provided it 
prepares and publishes a corresponding group management report according 
to "intemationally recogoized accounting principles." Here too, it is apparent 
that corporate law only follows the everyday practice of the capital market. 
Since 1997 companies in the "Neuer Markt" (New Market) have been obliged 
to draw up balance sheets according to lAS (International Accounting 
Standards) or U.S.-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).38 
This Anglo-American accounting, favored at present by the majority of 
listed companies, is nevertheless the subject of considerable debate. 39 The 
Iack of accounting standardization presents the danger of a two-tiered 
37. Duden, AG 250, 252 (1997) (supporting KUting & Hütten). 
38. KOMPEL. supra note 20, at 7.22 (Neur MarketRuteboot (Mar. 10, 1997)). Su also BT-Drs. 
1219909 no. 456 at 11 (expressing the viewpoint ofthe legislature). 
39. Su gentrally Claussen, AG 278, 280 (1993). 
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It should be noted tbat in the personal field of application, obligations 
only partially affect the group but also affect the single company. This points 
to a cooceptual confusion which the legislature must resolve.45 Thus it is 
difficult to understand why the disclosure obligations of Art. 285 HGB only 
apply to listed siogle companies but not to groups.46 lf the funds Statement 
eoables the misleadiog secret dispersion of hiddeo reserves in the anoual 
financial statement or the misleading exercise of evaluation election rights 
(Bewer-tungswahlrechten) and the profitability/risk structute47 to be better 
uncovered, it is difficult to see why this Obligation is not extended to listed 
single companies.48 The criticism of two-tiered accountiog would be 
weakened if listed siogle companies were also permitted to undertake 
accounting according to international accounting regulations. In this way the 
intended divis1on between listed and unlisted joint stock companies would 
also be implemented consistently. 
bb) Obligations for Regulated Unofficial Trading? 
The foregoing strict disclosure Obligations apply only to listed companies. 
Differentiation between listed and unlisted joiot stock companies is legitimate. 
In Art. 3 AktG, the listed company is legally defined as a company whose 
sbares are admitted to a market.49 But shares of a company are only admitted 
to an authorized,so or regulated51 market, and to the Neue Markt, 52 but not to 
unofficial tradiog.53 According to the legislative iotent, the company wbose 
shares are only traded unofficially should not be classified as a listed 
company,54 because these are also excepted from the WpHG (German 
Securities Tradiog Act)55 and the KWG ( German Banking Supervision Act)56 
45. KUbler, ZGR 550, 554 (2000) (agreeing). 
46. Böeking & Onh, supra nole 10, at 1873, 1874. 
47. PeUens & Bonse, supra nole 13, at 785, 788. 
48. /d. See also Zimmer, supra note 41, at 3521,3531. 8111 see FN-IDW 50 (1998) (dissenting). 
49. Council Directive 94/19/EC, 1997 OJ. (L 135) 5 (EC Dir. on Deposit Guaranlee Schemes); 
Council Ditective 97/99/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 84) 221 (EC Dir. on Investor Compensation). See also BGBI. 
I S. 1842 (1998). 
50. Alt. 36 tt stq. BörsG. 
51. Alt . 71 et seq. B&sG. 
52. Pottho & Stuhlfaulh, WM-Sonderbeliage No. 3 1, 7 (1997) (regarding lhe WpHG). But see 
Claussen, SUPranote 13, at 177, 178 (excluding lhe Neuen Matkt from apptication). 
53. Art. 78 BörsG. 
54. BT-Drs. 1319712 at 12. See also BT-Drs. 13ni42; Böclcing & Orth, DB 1873 (1998). 
55. Alt. 2 piiJ'lL 5 WpHG. 
56. Alt. I para. 3(e) KWG. 
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respectively. In support of such a differentiation it may be said that small or 
foreign57 companies would be deterred by further-reaching information 
obligations and therefore would avoid listing on the Stockexchange. After all, 
there are guidelines for unofficial trading according to which information 
should be provided on shareholders meetings, issues of dividends, changes to 
capital and other circumstances. In addition, company shares are often the 
object of unofficial trading against a company' s will. 
However, tbe systematic connection to the WpHG is itself questionable. 
The defmition of the organized market is narrow, 58 because unofficial trading 
as weil as insider surveillance59 are also subject to the rules of conduct for 
investment services accordingto Art. 31-37 a WpHG. The legislature intended 
to address the circurnstances where (1) an investor often falls to distinguish 
between individual marke t segments and (2) where insider and unofficial 
trading could also impinge upon the effective functioning of tbe official and 
regulated market as a market structured according to public law .60 This 
premise cannot be easily dismissed, as the stock broker is allowed to trade in 
shares from all three ma.rket segments within the framework of the stock 
exchange.61 One could also resolve the objection that foreign securities would 
avoid the German stock exchange if only German companies were subject to 
the same obligations as the admitted securities. Ultimately, the trading 
guidelines are of relatively weak effect because they are controlled only by the 
German Security Exchange (Deutsche Börse AG).62 
The decline nurober of listed jointstock companies in 1999 and 2000, 
when the market value of individual companies feil by a half or even two 
thirds, 63 prompts the suspicion that the amendments to the HOB and AktG can 
only have been a first step. Since the issue ofTelekom shares numerous small 
investors are discovering the share as an investment vehicle, partly because of 
the current lack of altematives.64 If this ernerging share culture is to grow65 
57. KOMPEL, supra note 20, § 60, at 73 er seq. (rejecting an ad hoc Obligation in unofficial trnding). 
58. Art. 2 para. 5 WpHG. See also art. 2 § 97 WpHG (commentary by Assmann & Schneider (2d 
ed. 1999)). 
59. Art. 12 et seq. WpHG. Cf. Counc.il Directive 89/592/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 334) art. 7 (Dir. on 
Insider Trading). For the full text of the Directive, see http://www.europa.eu.int. 
60. BT-Drs. 1216679, at 45 (discussing the n:asoning of the govemmeot bill (Regierungsentwurt) 
for the Third Flnancial Market Promotion Act ("Dritten Finanzmarkt1örderungsgesetz")). 
61. KOMPEL, supra note 20, § 60, at 73 et seq. 
62. See articles by KUmpel & Ott, supra note 20, at 455 n.20 (citing Art. 6 of the Proniefurt 
Unofficial Mark.et Rulebook (Apr. 28, 1998)). 
63. Examples ofsuch companiesinclude: Mobilcom, Berliner Freiverkehr, net.ipo., Praha Portifolio 
Bct. and Gazprom. 
64. Kölsch, WM 1169 (1996) (noting that in 1994 only 5% of German citizens owned shares); 
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and become an investment vehicle for the public at large, it must be 
guaranteed that confidence in the market is not shaken. 
If the small investor is to provide risk capital for such companies, he 
depends even more on company data. This means that, de lege ferenda, 
numerous obligations, derived from the need for transparency (such as the 
funds statement and segment report66) should be extended to shares in 
unofficial trading.67 Because this requirement is not particularly cost 
intensive, it should also be expected of small companies. In other words, 
these disclosures are the price corporations must pay for the capital resources 
of investors. 
In tbe future, it would be conceivable to differentiate between regulated 
and unregulated unofficial trading, as it existed up to 1986,68 and as 
Hopt/Baum again ~ecently proposed.69 That way, maximum flexibility could 
be achieved, without simultaneously (as with the creation of the Neuen Markt) 
having to altemate between the somewhat legally suspect hybrid of regulated 
market and unofficial trading.70 
b) Extension of the Material Scope of Application 
aa) Forecast on the Future Company Development and Company Report 
Capital market law requires an increase of information to facilitate 
rational investment decisions by investors. From the perspective of the capital 
market, the infonnation policy of company law is too heavily influenced by 
the "worst case" scenario to risk of company insolvency. 
What is traded on the stock exchange is tbe future. Not only the facts, but 
prognoses and rumors often influence market prices. The investor is primarily 
interested in pro fit forecasts,7 1 as the ratio of market price and company profits 
are quite important for future price movements. Thus, it would be sensible to 
Passow, WM 1931 {1997)(noting that in 1996 it was 6.5% andin 1997 7.4%); 15 WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE 
at 210 (1998). See alsoSteur, WM 281 et seq. (1995)(noting thegrowing significanceofsecurities as an 
investmcnt); EULER, SPARKASSEE 545 et seq. (1995). 
65. BUschgeo, FAZ, Feb. 8, 1997, atl7. 
66. Böeking & Ortb, supra note 10, at 1873, 1875, 1879 (caUiog for an obligation on aiJ uolisted 
limited companies for capital flow accounting and segmental reporting). 
67. See K!lbler, supra note 6, at 550, 563. 
68. Schwark, Börsengesetz, Art. 78, § I (2d ed. 1994). 
69. Hopt , supra note 6, at 434. 
70. ld. at410. 
71. Wer seine Anlegeramfairsttn behandelt, 22 DAS WERTPAPIER, 1998, at 54, SS. 
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check whether listed companies also have compulsively addressed the future 
positive development of the company. This obligation could achieve two 
results: 
First, a management report (with added forecast) could adequately 
supplement the ad hoc disclosure of the WpHG. While this ad hoc disclosure 
refers to factual matters,72 the management report addresses the requirement 
for infonnation on chances as unsecuredfacts. In this way, the phenomenon 
could be counteracted by the fact that ad hoc announcements currently contain 
no facts and are misused as advertising vehicles.73 Additionally, the supposed 
reading of tea leaves by investment advisers74 would be avoided, as the 
investor gets infonnation frrst band and the company, instead of investment 
advisers, becomes responsible for the information.75 
The directory regulation of Art. 289 paragraph 2 HGB is not observed.76 
Art. 289 paragraph 1 HGB is to be extended, de lege ferenda , to encompass 
the concept of chances. Perhaps indeed, we are merely at the threshold of a 
development that willlead to more transparency. Consideration should be 
given to reviving tbe old legal obligation to prepare a business report under 
Art. 160 AktG 1965,77 whereby tbe information discussed above could be 
clearly and understandably summarized. Under such legal provisions the 
company would, for example, be obligated to address the development of the 
sbare price and the result per share.78 
In any case, an infringement of these legal obligations would be 
sanctionable. Monitaring could be effected througb the auditor, the stock 
exchange, or the federal regulatory authority for securities trading 
72. Set Council Directive 89/592/EEC, 1989 OJ. (L 334) 3, 30 (discusslng the concept of 
"lnfonnation" in the European directive on insider dealings (implemented as fact in Art. 15 WpHG)). See 
also Grundmann, JZ 274,284 et seq. (1996); Möllers~ JZ 787 (1996); Möllers, supra note 3, at 334, 347. 
73. Casper, FAZ. May 2, 1999 at 22 (discussing the misuse of advertising). 
74. KUmpel, AG 66, 69 (1997) (noting that subjective evaluations can influence stock priccs). 
75. The stock prices quoted for net.ipo. a company traded on the unlisted marltet, ranged between 
370 and 20 Euro in the firsthalf of 1999. The actual price ranged between 140 and 40 Euro at this time. 
This extreme volatility unnervcs the investor. Company data can be reassuring. For standards of analysis 
on the Neuen Markt only, sec FAZ. May 28, 1999, at 25. 
76. See supra note 33. The generat opinion assumes a reportlng Obligation and rejects an optional 
right. See Art. 289 § 2~ HGB (commentary by Ellrott, Beck'scher Bilanz-Kommentar}. Fora clarification 
of the management report see BAETGE & FisCHER ET AL., DER MANAGEMEI'IT REPoRT (1989). See also 
Ballwicser, supra note 33, at 151 et seq. 
77. Besidcs the management report, it contains commentary, which has tobe observed as the basis 
ofproper accounting. See Ballwieser, supra note 33, at 151, 157. See also Baetge & Anneloh et al., DB 
176, 177 (1997); Baetge & Schulze, DStR 176, 177 (1997). 
78. Parpositive and negativeexamples among the30 DAX companies see BAU.WIESER, supra note 
33,at l5l,l72etseq.,l71. 
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("Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel" -BA We ). The most direct 
material control, however, would be through the auditor, who already has to 
scrutinize the management report to lookforpossible negative implications.79 
bb) European and International Developments in the Funds Statement and 
Accounting 
The legislature has not specified the funds Statement in any more detail. 
This is difficult to understand because the funds statement and segment report 
have long been standard under international and U.S. disclosure rules.80 
Furthermore, reliance on the internationally recognized standards would have 
been quite possible,81 considering that the legislature has done this already 
with regard to the international accounting principles. 
Accounting has become the subject of intensive discussion in other 
member states of the EC. 82 The current legal requirement that the 
consolidated report sbould correspond to intemationally recognized 
accounting recognitions on the one band, and the 7th Directive on company 
law on the . other,83 is frequently impossible to fulfill as has been 
demonstrated. 84 Thus, it is hoped that a refonn of the 4th and 7th accounting 
directives will address the international barmonization of accounting 
regulations. 85 
79. Art. 317. para. 2 HGB. It was also mentioned in the discussion that neitherthe German stock 
exchange nor regulatory authorities have the personnel to check company reports thoroughly. Conversely, 
Herr Georg Wittich, President of the BA We, notes !hat the Australian authorities maintain a staff of 1,300. 
See also HIRTE, GEsTALUNCSFREIHEIT 1M GESEU.SCHAFTSRECHT 61, 93 et seq. (Lutter & Wiedernano eds .. 
1998); HOPr,GESTALUNGSFREIHEITIMGESEUSCHAFTSRECHT 123,131 etseq. (Lutter&Wiedemanneds., 
1998). See also SCHLESSEL, lsTDASDEUTSCHEGESEW>CHAFTSRECHTKAPITALMARKTTAUGLICH? Ag 442 
et seq. (1999) (during the second "Kapitalmarlctrechtssymposium" of the Deutsche Börse AG, calling for 
monitorlog by the regulatory authorities). For more information on the German Stock Exchange, see 
http://www.exchange.de. 
80. KUting & Pilhofer, DStR 559 et seq., 603 et seq. (I 999); Jakoby &. Schmechel, WPg 225 et seq. 
(1999); Böcklng & Orth. supra note 10, at 1873, 1874; PeUens & Bonseet al .. supra not~ 13,at 785, 788; 
Zimmer, supra note41, at3521, 3531. 
81 . A reference to IAS 7 would have been possible. See PeUens & Bonse et al., supra note I 3, at 
785, 788; Böeking & Orth, WPg 351, 362 (1998). 
82. See van Hulle, WPg 138 er seq. (1998) (discussing Belgium, Denmark, Italy and France). 
83. Art. 292(a) para. 2 no. 2(a)-(b) HGB. 
84. SCHULZE-ÜSTI!RLOH, DIE REFORM DER KOZERNRECHUNCSLEGUNG NACH IAS UND US-GAAP 
301, 307 (Hommelhoff & Röhricht eds.); Pellens & Bonse et al., supra note 13, at 785, 787. 
85 . See Claussen. supra note 27, at 278, 279 (discussingthe attempt by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) to supplement the 4th and 7th Dir. on Company law); HA VERMANN, supra 
note 27, at 656,668 et seq.; VONCOLBE, supra note 27, atl7, 28 (discussingthe Iimitation ofacx:ounting 
Jaw). See also van Hulle, supra note 82, at 139 et .req. (noting that the EU Commission prefors IAS); Ernst, 
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c) The New RoJe of Auditors 
Some of the most marked changes under the KonTraG have been to the 
position of the auditor. Legalchangesnow recognize an auditor's position, 
bis material responsibilities, and communication with the supervisory board. 
aa) Under the new law the auditor is no Ionger appointed by the 
management board or the annual general meeting but by the supervisory board 
alone.89 The supervisory board selects its own auditor.90 To counteract bias 
concems, the fee share attributable to the single auditing commission may 
only amount to 30% of the total remuneration for the professional activity.91 
A rotation of auditors is compulsory for officially listed companies in which 
the auditor has issued the audit certificate in seven instances in the last ten 
years.92 
bb) On the material side, the complete redrafting of Art. 321 HGB is 
most noticeable. Reform is also aimed at informing non-expert supervisory 
board members with necessary clarity9l (i.e. giving them significant 
information and ideas on possible sources of error or weak points in the 
company organization).94 As reformed, the auditor's examination now also 
refers to the risk report of the management report95 as weil as with listed joint 
stock companies "with official listing" to the intemal surveillance system 
required to be established.96 This Controlling examination,97 or business 
audit,98 must be included in a special part of the auditor's report (business 
report).99 Finally, the audit certificate must address possible risks in the 
report. 100 
cc) Improved communication with the supervisory board is significant. 
The auditor' s report is no Iongertobe passed to the board of management, but 
89. Art . I 11 para. 2, at 3 AktG. 
90. Zimmer, supra note41, at 3521,3532. 
91. An . 3 19 para. 2 no. 8 HGB. 
92. An. 3 19 para. 3 no. 5 HGB. 
93. BT·Drs. 13/9712 at 28. See also Art. 322 para. 2 HGB. 
94. BT-Drs. 13/9712 at 28. 
95. Art. 3 17 para. 2 § 2 HGB. 
96. At1. 317 para. 4 HGB; Art. 91 para. 2 AktG. 
97. Hornmelhoff, BB 2625 (1998). 
98. WEBER. EsSAYS IN MEMORY OFBAETGE 781 ,793 (1997); Dömer, WPg 306 (1998) (discussing 
the development from "financial audit" to "business audit"). 
99. Art. 321 para. 4 HGB. 
100. At1. 322 para. 3 HGB. 
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binding "stimulation norms," 110 as Hommelhoffhas vividly tenned them, the 
danger nevertheless arises that they will continue to be dismissed and ignored. 
Laws should not merely create the appearance oflegislative activity, bowever, 
and must be of more than token significance. Thus, the voluntary character 
or Iack of sanctions, the practical value of the amendments including the new 
risk management system, must be seen as rather Iow. 111 
As Thon pointed out in the 19th century, legal nonns are fundamentally 
of an imperative, ob Iigatory nature, intended to compel a certain behavior. 1 12 
Four principal factors can cause stimulatory norms to be more than merely 
token law, and tobe actually observed and applied by their addressees. 
First, under Art. 77 paragraph 2 AktG, the supervisory board is entitled 
to issue standing orders to the board of management. In this way, the 
supervisory board can, through the standing orders, require regular reports of 
the auditing department to the board of management. Second, the greater 
responsibility given to the supervisory board (with regard to the board of 
management) is also particularly significant. The supervisory board is not 
only accountable during the annual general meeting, 1 13 but also has to report 
on the type and manner of its control over management, with listed companies 
also reporting on committees. 114 Third, in the past, the material 
responsibilities of the board of management and supervisory board were 
undermined by the fact that the procedures foundered on high minimum 
quorum. 115 Art. 147 paragraph 3 AktG has now lowered this hurdle and eased 
the position for claims. 116 Finally, at least as s.ignificant as this change is the 
ARA GIGarmenheck decision of the BGH. The BGH recognizes a degree of. 
liability-free discretion for the management board. However, if these 
110. Hommelhoff & Mattheus, supra note 104, at 149, 2:50. See aLro supra note 88. 
111. Hoffman-Becking, supra notc 107. 
112. OnThon'slmpcrativetheorysee: ThON,RECHTSNORMUNDSUBJEKTIVESREcHT(I878); I VON 
IHeRJNG, DER ZWECK IM REcHT (1878); 4 FlKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES REcHTS 150 ( 1977); ENGISCH, 
EINFÜHRUNG IN Oll! RECHTSWISSENSCHAFf 22 et seq., 200 et seq. (8th ed. 1983); LARENZ, 
METHODENLEHRE DER REcHTSWISSENSCHAFT 253 (6th ed. 1991); MÖLLERS. EsSAYS IN MEMORY OF 
FlKENTSCHEN 144 et seq. (1998). 
113. Baumbach&Hueck, Art. 171 § 10 AktG(l3thed.l968); Theisen, BB 705 (1988); Geßler,Art. 
171 § 14 AktG (1993); Baums, ZIP 11, 13 (1995). But see Möllers, ZIP 1725, 1734 (1995). See also 
CLAUSSEN&KORTH,KöLNERKOMMENTARZ.Art. l71 § 14 (2d ed.1986);Kropf,Art . 171 §40etseq. 
AktG (1973); ADLER & DORINC ET AL, REcHNUNGSLEGUNG UND PROFUNO DER UNTERNEHMEN Art. 171 
§ 43 et seq. (5th ed. 1987). 
114. Art. 171 para. 2 AktG. 
115. Bt-Drs. 13/9712 at 21. 
116. See Zimmer, NJW 3521, 3527 (1998) (offering a critic:al view); Ulmer, 163 ZHR 290 et seq. 
(1999) (noting that the 5% clause only operates for a gross violation); Krieger, 163 ZHR 343 et seq. (1999) 
(offering a morepositive view); Sünner, 163 ZHR 364, 369 et seq. (1999). 
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It must be asked, however, why this controlling check only applies to 
companies whose securities are officially traded.129 If improved independent 
auditing serves to reduce the "expectation gap" which was created by the.audit 
certificate of the auditor, 130 this improvement is lost on jointstock companies 
whose securities are not officially traded. This check should at least be 
extended to all segments of the regulated market and also to the Neuer Markt 
and Smax. 131 
bb) As points 1 through 4 of the preamble to the Company Directive 
express, corporate law must primarily protect the company members, its 
shareholders at the annual generat meeting, 132 so that vital control and 
information does not end at the supervisory board Ievel. De lege ferenda, 
expanding the amount of information that shareholders have, an entitled 
strengthening of the information rights of the shareholders with regard to the 
auditor, is a measure worthy of consideration. 133 
N. TRANSPARENCY 
1. European Law and Art. 335 Paragraph 1 No. 6 HGB 
Article 335 HGB provides for a fine of up to 10,000 DM for an abuse in 
the disclosure of an annual financial statement. Under § 2, however, the 
registry court can only intervene if certain specifically delineated groups of 
persons apply. The practice of disclosure was neutralized because only a 
fraction of the 600,000 private limited companies (GmbH) actually published 
their annual financial statements. 134 With the narrow application of the 
requirement, Germany has consciously fallen short, according to Lutter, öfthe 
disclosure obligation. Here too, the capital market relevance for joint stock 
companies is not insignificant, they are not compelled by stock exchange 
129. Hommelhoff, supra note 120, at 2625; Böeking & Orth, supra note 10, at 1873, 1879 ( offerlog 
a critical view). 
130. BT-Drs. 13/9712 at 29. An expectation gap is defined as a discrepancy betweeo the public 
expeclation of the extent, sense and aim of the legal aud.it on the one hand, and the professional practice 
of the auditor according to legal requirements on the other. See WEBER. EssAYS IN MEMORY OF BAETGE 
78 1,797 et seq. (1997); Böeking & Orth, supra note 128, at 351, 352. 
131. Panicipation in SMAX requires a contract with the Deutsche Börstn AG. See SMAX 
Admission Ru.les § 1. For further information sec ht1p://www.exchange.de. 
132. 4th Dir. on Company Law, supra note 23. 
133. Honunellhoff. BB 2625, 2631 (1998). 
134. LUTJ'ER, EUROPÄISCHES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 142 (4th ed. 1996) (mentioning 10%); Vogel, 
Die Rechnungsleg~tngsvorschriften des HOB für Kapitalgesellschaften und die, EG-RI~IE 102 
(1993); Lutterrnan, EuZW 264 (1998). 
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intention. Tbe circle of responsible parties has also been extended. 144 Among 
the most significant reforms is the fact that the injured party under the oew 
version of Art. 46 paragraph 2 BörsG no Ionger has to be the holder of 
securities in order to pursue a claim. This makes it possible for security 
holders to sell tbeir securities in time to avoid a total loss. Under the old, 
highly unsatisfactory legal position, a claim for prospectus liability was 
excluded. 145 The present legal position corresponds not only to equity but also 
general principles of compensatory law, such as the mitigation obligation of 
Art. 254 paragraph 2 BGB. 146 
3. Ad Hoc Disclosure and the Joint Stock Company 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate in detail questions 
raised by the jointstock company' s avoidance of insiderdeallog offenses and 
observance of ad hoc disclosure. 147 It is highly controversial whether the ad 
hoc disclosure represses company law;48 or rather on the basis of multi-
layered decision process, the competence of the individual organs remains 
largely unaffected. 149 _Ultimately, it is bound to prevail that. at least in 
individual questions of the capital market law, company law should prevail. 150 
144. OLG Fl'llllkfurt. ZIP, 107 (1997) (giving an early view). 
145. AsSMANN &: SCHOTzE. HANDBUCH DES KAPITALANLAGERECHTS Art. 7 § 207 (2d ed. 1997); 
ORUNDMANN, BANKRECHTSHANDBUCH Art. 112 §52 (1997); LG Frankfurt, ZIP, 25 (1996) (commenting 
on the prcvious legnl position); Hocren &: Sachsenmilch, EwiR Art. 45 BörsG I 081 (1995); OLG Frankfun, 
ZIP(I997);NIW-RR 107 (1~7); Koller, EwiRArt.45BörsG 157 (1997);Schwark&Sacbsenmilch, WuB 
I G 8-2.97. 
146. Su also Art. 20 para. 1 KAGG; Art. 12 AusllnvestmG. 
147. HIRTE, BANKRECHSTAG 47 ~~ seq. (1995); SCHNEIDER&: SINCHOF, EssAYS IN MEMORY OF 
KRAFT 585 er seq. (1998); Cabn, 162 ZHR I er seq. (1998); Burgbard, 162 ZHR SI er seq. (1998); 
Ekkenga. ZGR 165 er seq. (Im); Casper, WM 363 er seq. (Im). 
148. HIRTE,BANKRECHSTAG,47,53etstq. (1995). SeeF.llenga,supranote 147,at 165 (diseu5sing 
a capital market law view). 
149. Su Burgbard, 162 ZHR 51 er seq. (1998). 
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Here, the compulsory disclosure duties should be increased by means of 
an interplay between corporate law norms and stock exchange law norms. 
The legal requirement of the HGB that obligates a company to prepare an 
annual balance sheet is still not sufficient to truly meet the information needs 
of the investor. In corporate law, the purely negative format of the 
management report is to be criticized because areas of business development 
and fiscal forecasts of the company are not dealt with. 154 
The requirement for twice annual intermediate reports under Art. 44b 
BörsG is still clearly inadequate to meet disclosure interests. On the ground 
of transparency for example, it is questionable why the duty to provide 
intermediate reports155 or even informationinan investor' s prospectus IS6 is not 
necessary for the regulated market or unofficial trading. Instead. the Neue 
Markt, 157 the SMAX, 158 or the Bavarian "Prädikatsmarkt" indicate an 
advisable direction to follow: the publication of a quarterly report.159 The 
present purely private law segmental differentiation, however, Ieads to a 
variety of disclosure requirements, which the private investoris no Ionger able 
to distinguish between. The BörsG should follow this and raise the reporting 
requirements for the official and regulated markets. 160 
2. The Tension Between Company Law and Capital Marker Law 
Demands for an obligatory share law have always been met with the 
argument that they would be allen to the individual, legally overburden 
regulation of the joint stock company and hinder the flexibility of the 
individual company. 161 However, this conclusion is not logically consistent 
because the joint stock company is subject to numerous mandatory rules by 
virtue of its statutes and is therefore clearly distinguished from the GmbH. 162 
IS4. See supra Part D.3.b. 
ISS. Art. 76, 44(b) BörsG. 
1S6. lnst.ead of a stock exchange listing prospectus pursuantto Art. 36 § 2 no. 3 BörsG, the AG is 
only required torender a company report on the regulated marketunder Art. 73 § 1 no. 2 BörsG. 
157. See articJes by Kümpel & Ott, supra note 20, at Art. 72 S.2 8z. 3 § 4S6 (ciling Point 7 .I of the 
Neuer Markt Rulebook (Oct. 3, 1997)). See also Hopt & Rudolph et al., supra note 6, at 289, 3S6 et seq. 
(commenting on the Neuer Markt). 
158. SMAX Admission Rule pt. 3.1. 
159. See also Frey, DStR 294 et seq. (1999); Maute, DStR 687 et seq. (1999). 
160. And possibly extend itto unofficial trading. See supra Part ll.3.b. 
161. See supra note 109. 
162. This is because the statute requireme.nts of Art. 23 § 5 AktG significantly Iimit Statutes 
autonomy. See HOMMELHOFF, DAS SYSTEM DER KAPITALGESEU.SCHAf'TEN IM UMBRUCH-EIN 
INTERNATIONALER VERGLEICH 26 et seq. (Roth ed., 1990); Bartz. Großkommentar z. Art. 23 § 18 AktG 
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